Old Wine, Old Bottles, and Not Very New Corks: On State RFRAs and Free Exercise Jurisprudence by Strasser, Mark
Saint Louis University Public Law Review 
Volume 34 
Number 2 General Issue (Volume XXXIV, No. 2) Article 7 
2015 
Old Wine, Old Bottles, and Not Very New Corks: On State RFRAs 
and Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
Mark Strasser 
Capital University Law School, mstrasser@law.capital.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Strasser, Mark (2015) "Old Wine, Old Bottles, and Not Very New Corks: On State RFRAs and Free Exercise 
Jurisprudence," Saint Louis University Public Law Review: Vol. 34 : No. 2 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
335 
OLD WINE, OLD BOTTLES, AND NOT VERY NEW CORKS: ON 
STATE RFRAS AND FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 
MARK STRASSER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
State actors can engage in nullification in many ways. While a 
paradigmatic example involves a public official interfering in some way in the 
recognition or enforcement of individual rights arising under federal law, other 
examples include a state legislature’s disapproving of a court’s interpretation 
of federal law and then enacting more protective legislation. Several states 
have passed state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) after the 
United States Supreme Court offered a narrow interpretation of free exercise 
guarantees in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith1 and struck down the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores.2 
Smith was controversial and likely understated the protections afforded 
under free exercise guarantees.3 Nonetheless, the Court had not been consistent 
with respect to its recognition of the strength of free exercise guarantees in the 
case law preceding Smith,4 and a (legislative) rejection of a particular decision 
like Smith does not establish how the guarantees should be construed. Even a 
legislature’s rejecting Smith and endorsing certain decisions like Sherbert v. 
Verner5 or Wisconsin v. Yoder6 does much less work than might be thought, 
because the Court allegedly applied the protections recognized in those 
decisions when affording little protection in other contexts.7 It thus should not 
 
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio. 
 1. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 2. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 3. Cf. Douglas Laycock, Essay, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 885–86 (1994) (“[T]he state should not burden a religious practice 
without a compelling reason. That was the rule that prevailed in the Supreme Court from Sherbert 
v. Verner in 1963 until just before the Smith case in 1990.”). 
 4. See infra Part II.D. 
 5. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 6. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 7. See infra notes 77–98 and accompanying text (discussing Braunfeld in which the Court 
claimed to be applying the test later used in Sherbert while not providing much free exercise 
protection) and infra notes Part II.D and accompanying text (discussing Lee in which the Court 
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be surprising that courts interpreting the state RFRAs, which often involve 
implementing or following the pre-Smith jurisprudence, have been less 
protective than might have been hoped. 
Part II of this article addresses the developing free exercise jurisprudence, 
noting some of the mixed signals that the Court has sent with respect to the 
breadth and depth of those guarantees. Part III addresses some of the state 
responses to Smith’s narrow reading of free exercise guarantees and offers 
some suggestions about why the state RFRAs have not resulted in the kind of 
robust protection of free exercise guarantees that might initially have been 
expected. The article concludes that the state RFRA cases illustrate some of the 
complexities of attempting to implement a respectful free exercise 
jurisprudence and some of the dangers that can arise especially for those with 
minority religious views or practices. 
II.  THE CHANGING FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 
In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the 
breadth and depth of free exercise guarantees.8 Rather than offer a clear picture 
of those guarantees, however, the Court has instead sent mixed messages about 
how heavy a burden the state must bear when seeking to limit religious 
practices.9 Precisely because the free exercise opinions not only adopted 
differing approaches but also made implausible distinctions when attempting to 
reconcile the cases previously decided, the jurisprudence prior to Smith was 
open to such different interpretations that those loudly proclaiming their wish 
to return to the pre-Smith jurisprudence did not thereby provide much guidance 
with respect to what they thought free exercise guarantees protected. 
A. The Application of Free Exercise Guarantees 
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
free exercise guarantees afforded by the First Amendment10 to the United 
States Constitution were incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment against 
the states.11 Because those guarantees also limited the degree to which states 
 
claimed to be applying the test used in Yoder and Sherbert but not providing robust free exercise 
protection). 
 8. See infra Part II.A–D. 
 9. See infra notes 77–120 and accompanying text (discussing Braunfeld and Sherbert in 
which the Court allegedly used the same test but came up with such different holdings that the 
opinions do not seem capable of being reconciled in a plausible way). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .”). 
 11. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First Amendment declares 
that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as 
incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”). 
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could limit religious practices, the Court then had a variety of opportunities to 
spell out which burdens states could and could not place on free exercise. 
The Cantwell Court explained that the religious freedoms protected by the 
First Amendment are quite robust: “Freedom of conscience and freedom to 
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may 
choose cannot be restricted by law.”12 Further, the Constitution protects not 
only an individual’s right to believe, but also an individual’s right to act in 
accord with conscience.13 That said, the freedom to believe and the freedom to 
act in accord with religious belief are not given the same degree of protection. 
“[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to 
act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. 
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.”14 Yet, 
announcing that religious conduct may be regulated to protect society does not 
provide much guidance—the protection of society encompasses a wide range 
of threats, from grave dangers to minor inconveniences, and more must be said 
before that can be a helpful standard. 
B. The Accuracy of Religious Beliefs 
Even before one discusses what the state must show to justify its 
limitations on religious exercise, a prior question involves which kinds of 
beliefs or activities count as religious for First Amendment purposes. In United 
States v. Ballard,15 the Court addressed the degree to which the state could 
second-guess the tenets of a particular religion. 
Edna and Donald Ballard were convicted of fraud.16 They claimed to have 
supernatural powers enabling them to cure the sick.17 Individuals would send 
them “money, property, and other things of value,”18 hoping that the 
detrimental effects of severe or terminal illness might be avoided. The Ballards 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. (“it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion”). 
 14. Id. at 303–04. 
 15. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 16. Id. at 79 (“Respondents were indicted and convicted for using, and conspiring to use, the 
mails to defraud. § 215 Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 338, 18 U.S.C.A. § 338; § 37 Criminal Code, 
18 U.S.C. § 88, 18 U.S.C.A. § 88.”). 
 17. See id. at 80 (“Edna W. Ballard and Donald Ballard had, by reason of supernatural 
attainments, the power to heal persons of ailments and diseases and to make well persons afflicted 
with any diseases, injuries, or ailments.”). 
 18. See id. 
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allegedly knew that they had no power to cure the sick,19 although they argued 
that they could not be punished for their religious beliefs.20 
The trial court told the jury that its task was not to assess the truth of the 
defendants’ beliefs,21 but only to consider whether the defendants believed 
what they preached.22 Further, defendants’ counsel did not object to the court’s 
direction to the jury that the sincerity of belief was the focus of the inquiry.23 
The Ballard Court explained that “[f]reedom of thought . . . embraces the 
right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are 
rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths.”24 It thus did not matter that 
“[t]he religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not 
preposterous, to most people.”25 The Court cautioned that if the Constitution 
were to permit those beliefs to be set “before a jury charged with finding their 
truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any 
sect.”26 For that reason, “the District Court ruled properly when it withheld 
from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious 
beliefs or doctrines of respondents.”27 Thus, the Constitution does not permit 
the state to determine the accuracy of religious beliefs. 
C. Which Beliefs Are Religious? 
Suppose that an individual has deeply held and well-considered beliefs that 
play a central role in her life, even if those beliefs are not part of an organized 
set of beliefs including some notion of a supreme being. Would those beliefs 
count as religious for free exercise purposes? 
 
 19. Id. (“Each of the representations enumerated in the indictment was followed by the 
charge that respondents ‘well knew’ it was false.”). 
 20. Id. at 80–81 (“There was a demurrer and a motion to quash each of which asserted 
among other things that the indictment attacked the religious beliefs of respondents and sought to 
restrict the free exercise of their religion in violation of the Constitution of the United States.”). 
 21. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 81 (“[I]t is immaterial what these defendants preached or wrote or 
taught in their classes. They are not going to be permitted to speculate on the actuality of the 
happening of those incidents.”). 
 22. Id. (“The issue is: Did these defendants honestly and in good faith believe those things? 
If they did, they should be acquitted.”). 
 23. Id. at 82 (“[C]ounsel for the defense acquiesced in this treatment of the matter, made no 
objection to it during the trial, and indeed treated it without protest as the law of the case 
throughout the proceedings prior to the verdict.”). 
 24. Id. at 86. 
 25. Id. at 87. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 88. See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) 
(“[W]hile the ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question 
whether it is ‘truly held.’ This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in 
every case.”). 
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While not speaking directly to that point,28 the Court did address whether 
an individual had to believe in God in order to be considered a conscientious 
objector in Seeger v. United States29 and Welsh v. United States,30 and those 
decisions have been interpreted to establish the robustness of free exercise 
guarantees.31 However, a subsequent decision involving conscientious 
objectors undercut such an interpretation.32 
Daniel Seeger refused to submit to induction, claiming to be a 
conscientious objector.33 While stating that his refusal to participate in war in 
any form was based on religious beliefs, he preferred to leave open whether he 
believed in God34 and instead based his beliefs on his reading the works of 
various thinkers.35 His views were found to be sincere,36 and the reason for his 
denial of conscientious objector status in the district court was that his beliefs 
were not tied to a belief in a supreme being.37 
The Seeger Court interpreted Congress’s linking the exemption to a 
supreme being as Congress’s “merely clarifying the meaning of religious 
training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially 
political, sociological, or philosophical views.”38 The Court further explained 
that “under this construction, the test of belief ‘in a relation to a Supreme 
 
 28. But cf. Terri Jane Lavi, Note, Free Exercise Challenges to Public School Curricula: Are 
States Creating “Enclaves of Totalitarianism” through Compulsory Reading Requirements?, 57 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 301, 321–22 (1988) (discussing “the expansive definition of religion the 
Court adopted in Seeger and Welch”). 
 29. Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 30. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 31. Cf. Steven D. Collier, Beyond Seeger/Welsh: Redefining Religion under the Constitution, 
31 EMORY L.J. 973, 982 (1982) (“Commentators generally have agreed that the Seeger/Welsh 
definition is the constitutional definition of religion, at least for purposes of the Free Exercise 
Clause.”). 
 32. See infra notes 56–72 and accompanying text (discussing Gillette v. United States). 
 33. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166 (“He first claimed exemption as a conscientious objector in 1957 
after successive annual renewals of his student classification.”). See also id. at 164–65 (“These 
cases involve claims of conscientious objectors under § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training 
and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958 ed.), which exempts from combatant training and 
service in the armed forces of the United States those persons who by reason of their religious 
training and belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.”). 
 34. Id. at 166 (“[H]e declared that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in 
any form by reason of his ‘religious’ belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to his belief 
in a Supreme Being open, ‘rather than answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.’”). 
 35. Id. (“He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical 
belief in intellectual and moral integrity.”). 
 36. Id. at 166–67 (“His belief was found to be sincere, honest, and made in good faith; and 
his conscientious objection to be based upon individual training and belief, both of which 
included research in religious and cultural fields.”). 
 37. Id. at 167 (“Seeger’s claim, however, was denied solely because it was not based upon a 
‘belief in a relation to a Supreme Being’ as required by § 6(j) of the Act.”). 
 38. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165–66. 
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Being’ is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a 
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in 
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.”39 Because Seeger’s 
opposition to war operated the same way within his belief system as it would 
in a system closely linked to a belief in a supreme being, Seeger had to be 
awarded conscientious objector status.40 
Elliot Welsh II was convicted of refusing to be drafted into the army.41 He 
challenged that conviction because he claimed to be a conscientious objector.42 
While Welsh “held deep conscientious scruples against taking part in wars 
where people were killed,”43 he denied that those beliefs were religious44 
except in the ethical sense of that word.45 
One of the questions at hand was whether Welsh’s beliefs were 
appropriately characterized as “essentially political, sociological, or 
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code,”46 especially because 
Welsh admitted that his views were based in part on his perceptions of world 
events.47 But the Court rejected that the exclusion from the exemption should 
apply “to exclude those who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and 
foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to participation in 
all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public 
policy.”48 The Court instead interpreted the exclusion to apply to “those whose 
beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest at all 
upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely upon 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 187 (“It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate what his beliefs were 
with regard to the usual understanding of the term ‘Supreme Being.’ But as we have said 
Congress did not intend that to be the test. We therefore affirm the judgment in No. 50.”). 
 41. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970) (“The petitioner, Elliott Ashton Welsh 
II, was convicted by a United States District Judge of refusing to submit to induction into the 
Armed Forces in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a), and was on June 1, 1966, sentenced to 
imprisonment for three years.”). 
 42. Id. (“One of petitioner’s defenses to the prosecution was that § 6(j) of the Universal 
Military Training and Service Act exempted him from combat and noncombat service because he 
was ‘by reason of religious training and belief . . . conscientiously opposed to participation in war 
in any form.’”). 
 43. Id. at 337. 
 44. Id. at 341 (“Welsh was far more insistent and explicit than Seeger in denying that his 
views were religious.”). 
 45. Id. (“Although he originally characterized his beliefs as nonreligious, he later upon 
reflection wrote a long and thoughtful letter to his Appeal Board in which he declared that his 
beliefs were ‘certainly religious in the ethical sense of the word.’”). 
 46. Id. at 342. 
 47. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342 (“Welsh’s conscientious objection to war was undeniably based 
in part on his perception of world politics.”). 
 48. Id. 
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considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency.”49 Believing “[t]he 
controlling facts in this case . . . strikingly similar to those in Seeger,”50 the 
Welsh Court found that Welsh should also be classified as a conscientious 
objector.51 
Justice Harlan concurred in the result, which he believed was 
constitutionally required.52 Justice White in his dissent suggested that 
conscientious objector status might be required as a matter of free exercise,53 
although he did not believe that nonreligionists would also have to be afforded 
an exemption.54 
Together, Welsh and Seeger might seem to suggest robust free exercise 
protection.55 Yet, Gillette v. United States56 undermines such an interpretation. 
Guy Gillette and Louis Negre were each convicted of refusing to serve 
their country in war,57 although each had claimed to have conscientious 
 
 49. Id. at 342–43. 
 50. Id. at 335. 
 51. Id. at 343–44 (“[W]e think Welsh was clearly entitled to a conscientious objector 
exemption. Section 6(j) requires no more. That section exempts from military service all those 
whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them 
no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.”). 
 52. Id. at 344–45 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I therefore find myself unable to escape facing 
the constitutional issue that this case squarely presents: whether § 6(j) in limiting this draft 
exemption to those opposed to war in general because of theistic beliefs runs afoul of the 
religious clauses of the First Amendment. For reasons later appearing I believe it does, and on 
that basis I concur in the judgment reversing this conviction.”). 
 53. Cf. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 369–70 (White, J., dissenting) (“Congress may have granted the 
exemption because otherwise religious objectors would be forced into conduct that their religions 
forbid and because in the view of Congress to deny the exemption would violate the Free 
Exercise Clause or at least raise grave problems in this respect.”). See also id. at 373 (White, J., 
dissenting) (“[F]ree exercise values prompt Congress to relieve religious believers from the 
burdens of the law at least in those instances where the law is not merely prohibitory but 
commands the performance of military duties that are forbidden by a man’s religion.”). 
 54. Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting) (“Surely a statutory exemption for religionists required 
by the Free Exercise Clause is not an invalid establishment because it fails to include nonreligious 
believers as well.”). 
 55. But see Matthew D. Krueger, Note, Respecting Religious Liberty: Why RLUIPA Does 
Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1179, 1191 (2005) (“While the broad 
Seeger/Welsh view of ‘religion’ has the virtue of tolerance—ensuring that claimants holding 
untraditional or unusual beliefs are not neglected—this view tends to diminish the freedom 
afforded to claimants. This is because legislatures and courts are unlikely to offer both strong 
protections from general laws and wide accessibility to those protections.”). 
 56. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
 57. See id. at 439 (“[P]etitioner Gillette was convicted of willful failure to report for 
induction into the armed forces.”). See id. at 440 (“[P]etitioner Negre, after induction into the 
Army, completion of basic training, and receipt of orders for Vietnam duty commenced 
proceedings looking to his discharge as a conscientious objector to war.”). 
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objections to serving in the Vietnam War.58 Sincerity of belief was not at 
issue.59 Further, recognizing that “these petitioners’ beliefs concerning war are 
‘religious’ in nature,”60 the Court did not base its decision on the exclusion 
related to “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a 
merely personal moral code.”61 Nonetheless, the Court suggested that Congress 
did not intend to offer conscientious objector status to those objecting to a 
particular war rather than to war in general.62 
Yet, such a distinction raises other difficulties because some faith 
traditions object to war as a general matter and other traditions only object to 
unjust wars, and Congress seemed to be respecting free exercise concerns for 
certain traditions but not others.63 The Court noted that the challenged section 
“on its face, simply does not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation or 
religious belief, apart of course from beliefs concerning war.”64 Because that 
was so, the Court interpreted the petitioners’ contention to be that “the special 
statutory status accorded conscientious objection to all war, but not objection 
to a particular war, works a de facto discrimination among religions,”65 a 
contention that could not “simply be brushed aside.”66 However, because 
differentiating between objections to all wars and to a particular war “serves a 
number of valid purposes having nothing to do with a design to foster or favor 
any sect, religion, or cluster of religions,”67 and because “valid neutral reasons 
 
 58. Id. at 439 (“In support of his unsuccessful request for classification as a conscientious 
objector, this petitioner had stated his willingness to participate in a war of national defense or a 
war sponsored by the United Nations as a peace-keeping measure, but declared his opposition to 
American military operations in Vietnam, which he characterized as ‘unjust.’”). Id. at 440–41 
(“Negre, a devout Catholic, believes that it is his duty as a faithful Catholic to discriminate 
between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars, and to forswear participation in the latter. His assessment of the 
Vietnam conflict as an unjust war became clear in his mind after completion of infantry training, 
and Negre is now firmly of the view that any personal involvement in that war would contravene 
his conscience and ‘all that I had been taught in my religious training.’”). 
 59. Id. at 440 (“Gillette’s defense to the criminal charge [was] rejected, not because of doubt 
about the sincerity or the religious character of petitioner’s objection to military service but 
because his objection ran to a particular war. . . . [N]o question is raised as to the sincerity or the 
religious quality of [Negre’s] views.”). 
 60. Id. at 447. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 447 (“[W]e hold that Congress intended to exempt persons who 
oppose participating in all war—‘participation in war in any form’—and that persons who object 
solely to participation in a particular war are not within the purview of the exempting section, 
even though the latter objection may have such roots in a claimant’s conscience and personality 
that it is ‘religious’ in character.”). 
 63. Id. at 448–49, 451–52. 
 64. Id. at 450. 
 65. Id. at 451–52. 
 66. Id. at 452. 
 67. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] ON STATE RFRAS AND FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 343 
exist for limiting the exemption to objectors to all war, . . . the section therefore 
cannot be said to reflect a religious preference.”68 The Court mentioned the 
nation’s religious diversity,69 suggesting that permitting objections to a war to 
serve as a basis for conscientious objection would create an even greater 
potential for indeterminacy and unfairness.70 
The Court expressly addressed the petitioners’ free exercise claim, 
suggesting that the government’s “incidental burdens felt by persons in 
petitioners’ position are strictly justified by substantial governmental interests 
that relate directly to the very impacts questioned.”71 For example, the Court 
noted the concern “of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service 
. . . that exemption of objectors to particular wars would weaken the resolve of 
those who otherwise would feel themselves bound to serve despite personal 
cost, uneasiness at the prospect of violence, or even serious moral reservations 
or policy objections concerning the particular conflict.”72 Thus, the Court 
accepted that according conscientious objector status to those with religious 
objections to particular wars might have too severe an impact on the conduct of 
the war. 
Perhaps Gillette can be explained by talking about the difficulty in 
distinguishing between those with sincere religious objections to the war and 
those with merely political objections to it.73 Yet, the Court accepted that 
political or moral objections to war as a general matter that were firmly held 
could be the basis of conscientious objector status in Welsh,74 so the Court 
should presumably be taken at its word that it believed a different decision 
 
 68. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 454. 
 69. Id. at 457 (“Ours is a Nation of enormous heterogeneity in respect of political views, 
moral codes, and religious persuasions.”). 
 70. See id. at 458 (“While the danger of erratic decision making unfortunately exists in any 
system of conscription that takes individual differences into account, no doubt the dangers would 
be enhanced if a conscientious objection of indeterminate scope were honored in theory.”); See 
also id. (discussing “the interest in fairness”). 
 71. Id. at 462. 
 72. Id. at 459–60. 
 73. Cf. Charles J. Reid, Jr., John T. Noonan, Jr., on the Catholic Conscience and War: 
Negre v. Larsen, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 881, 954 (2001) (“The difficulties in distinguishing 
between religious dissenters to a particular war and those dissenting on political grounds, the 
[Gillette] Court suggested, ‘are considerable.’”); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, 
The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1295–96 (1994) (“[W]e might think it unreasonable for secular objectors to 
build moral identities around distinctions that they themselves recognize as matters inviting 
political resolution. This argument carries less weight with respect to religious objectors, since 
the state may no more pass upon the reasonableness of religious distinctions among just and 
unjust wars than it may pass upon the reasonableness of religious beliefs about wearing 
yarmulkes or eating beef on Friday. Those who accept this line of reasoning might endorse 
Gillette while rejecting Negre.”). 
 74. See supra notes 37–50 and accompanying text (discussing Welsh). 
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might seriously impair the war effort.75 In any event, Gillette does not 
represent a particularly robust protection of religious liberty.76 
D. The Robustness of Free Exercise Guarantees 
While claiming to be applying the same guarantees, the Court seems to 
vary the strength of the protections afforded under the Free Exercise Clause in 
different cases. In Braunfeld v. Brown,77 the Court discussed whether Sunday 
closing laws could be applied to Philadelphia retail merchants who, because of 
sincere religious belief, had to close their establishments on a day other than 
Sunday. “Each of the appellants is a member of the Orthodox Jewish faith, 
which requires the closing of their places of business and a total abstention 
from all manner of work from nightfall each Friday until nightfall each 
Saturday.”78 They “had previously kept their places of business open on 
Sunday, [and] . . . each of [the] appellants had done a substantial amount of 
business on Sunday, compensating somewhat for their closing on Saturday.”79 
The appellants claimed that forcing them to be closed on Sunday as well “will 
result in impairing the ability of all appellants to earn a livelihood and will 
render appellant Braunfeld unable to continue in his business, thereby losing 
his capital investment.”80 Enforcement of the law “will either compel 
appellants to give up their Sabbath observance, a basic tenet of the Orthodox 
Jewish faith, or will put appellants at a serious economic disadvantage if they 
continue to adhere to their Sabbath.”81 
The Braunfeld Court explained that while free exercise guarantees are 
robust and the “freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute,”82 it 
is nonetheless true that “the freedom to act, even when the action is in accord 
with one’s religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative 
restrictions.”83 Because “the statute at bar does not make unlawful any 
religious practices of appellants”84 but instead merely “operates so as to make 
 
 75. Arlin M. Adams & Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the 
Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 317, 339 (1988) (noting that “one of 
the most compelling state interests is that of government in protecting its citizens and borders 
through military conscription”). 
 76. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 
PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1206 (2013) (suggesting that Gillette represents a less robust protection of 
religious liberty). 
 77. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
 78. Id. at 601. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 602. 
 82. Id. at 603. 
 83. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04, 306 
(1940)). 
 84. Id. at 605. 
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the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive,”85 the law at issue was 
less burdensome than some that had been upheld in the past.86 Further, the 
Sunday closing law did not disadvantage “all members of the Orthodox Jewish 
faith but only those who believe it necessary to work on Sunday.”87 For those 
disadvantaged, the Court reasoned that the forced choice was not between 
practicing one’s religion and facing criminal penalty,88 but merely between 
choosing one kind of work versus another.89 
The Braunfeld Court justified its approach by noting that “we are a 
cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious 
preference.”90 Such diversity creates practical difficulties, and “it cannot be 
expected, much less required, that legislators enact no law regulating conduct 
that may in some way result in an economic disadvantage to some religious 
sects and not to others because of the special practices of the various 
religions.”91 A different analysis would be required if the legislation were 
targeting religion.92 
The Court offered a standard by which to determine whether the state was 
justified in burdening free exercise: “[I]f the State regulates conduct by 
enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to 
advance the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden 
on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means 
which do not impose such a burden.”93 Yet, it was not clear that the Sunday 
closing law passed muster even in light of the suggested standard, because the 
state might have accomplished its goals by requiring a day of rest but not 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) and Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 605 (“And even these are not faced with as serious a choice as forsaking their 
religious practices or subjecting themselves to criminal prosecution.”). 
 89. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605–06 (“Fully recognizing that the alternatives open to 
appellants and others similarly situated—retaining their present occupations and incurring 
economic disadvantage or engaging in some other commercial activity which does not call for 
either Saturday or Sunday labor—may well result in some financial sacrifice in order to observe 
their religious beliefs, still the option is wholly different than when the legislation attempts to 
make a religious practice itself unlawful.”). 
 90. Id. at 606. 
 91. Id. at 606–07. 
 92. Id. at 607 (“If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all 
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid 
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.”) 
 93. Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304–05 (1940)). 
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mandating that it be Sunday.94 Indeed, several states had adopted such an 
approach,95 although the Court did not believe such a solution required96 
because there would be added compliance costs were such an approach 
implemented.97 In addition, such an approach might afford those open on 
Sunday with an economic advantage.98 
Two years after Braunfeld’s tepid enforcement of free exercise 
guarantees,99 the Court decided Sherbert v. Verner.100 The case involved a free 
exercise challenge by Adell Sherbert, who was denied unemployment 
compensation after having been fired because she, as a Seventh Day Adventist, 
could not work on Saturdays without violating her religious convictions.101 
Sherbert could not find other employment that did not require her to work 
on Saturdays.102 The South Carolina Employment Security Commission 
rejected that her faith-based refusal to accept such employment qualified as 
“good cause” justifying her not accepting such a job offer.103 For that reason, 
her claim for unemployment compensation was denied.104 She unsuccessfully 
 
 94. Id. at 608 (“They contend that the State should cut an exception from the Sunday labor 
proscription for those people who, because of religious conviction, observe a day of rest other 
than Sunday.”). 
 95. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608 (“A number of states provide such an exemption, and this 
may well be the wiser solution to the problem.”). 
 96. Cf. id. (“But our concern is not with the wisdom of legislation but with its constitutional 
limitation.”). 
 97. Id. (“[T]o permit the exemption might well undermine the State’s goal of providing a 
day that, as best possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity. . . . 
[E]nforcement problems would be more difficult since there would be two or more days to police 
rather than one and it would be more difficult to observe whether violations were occurring.”). 
 98. Id. at 608–09 (“To allow only people who rest on a day other than Sunday to keep their 
businesses open on that day might well provide these people with an economic advantage over 
their competitors who must remain closed on that day; this might cause the Sunday-observers to 
complain that their religions are being discriminated against.”). 
 99. Donald Falk, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Bulldozing 
First Amendment Protection of Indian Sacred Lands, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 564 (1989) 
(describing Braunfeld’s free exercise protection as “weak”). 
 100. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 101. Id. at 399 (“Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church was discharged 
by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her 
faith.”). 
 102. Id. at 399–400 (“[S]he was unable to obtain other employment because from 
conscientious scruples she would not take Saturday work.”). 
 103. Id. at 401 (“The appellee Employment Security Commission, in administrative 
proceedings under the statute, found that appellant’s restriction upon her availability for Saturday 
work brought her within the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who fail, 
without good cause, to accept ‘suitable work when offered . . . by the employment office or the 
employer . . .’”). 
 104. See id. at 399–400. 
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challenged that denial in the state courts.105 The South Carolina Supreme Court 
held that “appellant’s ineligibility infringed no constitutional liberties because 
such a construction of the statute ‘places no restriction upon the appellant’s 
freedom of religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her 
right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the 
dictates of her conscience.’”106 
When reviewing the South Carolina Supreme Court decision, the United 
States Supreme Court began its analysis by asking whether Sherbert’s 
“disqualification as a beneficiary . . . [infringed upon] her constitutional rights 
of free exercise.”107 The Court explained that it did,108 because “the pressure 
upon her to forego that [religious] practice is unmistakable.”109 Basically, she 
was put in the position of having “to choose between following the precepts of 
her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the 
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”110 The 
Court analogized the choice she faced to one involving a government-imposed 
penalty: “Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of 
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against 
appellant for her Saturday worship.”111 
Yet, it would seem that the government had required the same kind of 
forced choice in Braunfeld.112 The Sherbert Court distinguished the two cases: 
[T]he state interest asserted in the present case is wholly dissimilar to the 
interests which were found to justify the less direct burden upon religious 
practices in Braunfeld v. Brown. The Court recognized that the Sunday closing 
law which that decision sustained undoubtedly served ‘to make the practice of 
(the Orthodox Jewish merchants’) religious beliefs more expensive.’113 But the 
statute was nevertheless saved by a countervailing factor which finds no 
equivalent in the instant case—a strong state interest in providing one uniform 
day of rest for all workers. That secular objective could be achieved, the Court 
found, only by declaring Sunday to be that day of rest. Requiring exemptions 
 
 105. See id. at 401. 
 106. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401 (citing Union Naval Stores Co. v. United States, 240 U.S. 286, 
303–04 (1916) and Sherbert v. Verner, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746 (S.C. 1962)). 
 107. Id. at 403. 
 108. Id. (In determining whether Sherbert’s disqualification infringed upon her rights, the 
United States Supreme Court found “it is clear that it does.”). 
 109. Id. at 404. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–06 (1961) (“[T]he alternatives open to 
appellants and others similarly situated-retaining their present occupations and incurring 
economic disadvantage or engaging in some other commercial activity which does not call for 
either Saturday or Sunday labor-may well result in some financial sacrifice in order to observe 
their religious beliefs.”). 
 113. Id. at 605. 
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for Sabbatarians, while theoretically possible, appeared to present an 
administrative problem of such magnitude, or to afford the exempted class so 
great a competitive advantage, that such a requirement would have rendered 
the entire statutory scheme unworkable. In the present case no such 
justifications underlie the determination of the state court that appellant’s 
religion makes her ineligible to receive benefits.114 
Thus, the Sherbert Court suggests that the law at issue in Braunfeld was 
narrowly drawn to promote compelling state interests, whereas the denial of 
unemployment benefits in Sherbert did not. Yet, such a characterization of the 
state interests implicated in Braunfeld is not plausible.115 For example, when 
the Braunfeld Court noted that some states required a day of rest without 
requiring that everyone rest on Sunday,116 the Court offered an example of 
such a statute117 without describing the experiences of those states. But no 
evidence was presented suggesting that those states incurred great difficulty 
when affording such flexibility,118 which undercuts the claim that the state’s 
interest in Sunday closing laws was compelling.119 But that makes Sherbert 
and Braunfeld difficult to reconcile, as some of the justices pointed out.120 
 
 114. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408–09. 
 115. See Steven M. Rosato, Saving Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” Amendment: Sharia Law in 
the West and Suggestions to Protect Similar State Legislation from Constitutional Attack, 44 
SETON HALL L. REV. 659, 672 (2014) (“Sherbert v. Verner . . . seems in direct conflict with the 
holding in Braunfeld.”). 
 116. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608. 
 117. See id. at 608 n.5 (citing IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-4301). 
 118. See id. at 614–15 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (“It is also true that a 
majority—21 of the 34 States which have general Sunday regulations have exemptions of this 
kind. We are not told that those States are significantly noisier, or that their police are 
significantly more burdened, than Pennsylvania’s.”). 
 119. See id. at 613–614 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (“What, then, is the 
compelling state interest which impels the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to impede appellants’ 
freedom of worship? What overbalancing need is so weighty in the constitutional scale that it 
justifies this substantial, though indirect, limitation of appellants’ freedom? . . . It is the mere 
convenience of having everyone rest on the same day. It is to defend this interest that the Court 
holds that a State need not follow the alternative route of granting an exemption for those who in 
good faith observe a day of rest other than Sunday.”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 561 
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“If the ‘free exercise’ of religion were subject to reasonable 
regulations, as it is under some constitutions, or if all laws ‘respecting the establishment of 
religion’ were not proscribed, I could understand how rational men, representing a predominantly 
Christian civilization, might think these Sunday laws did not unreasonably interfere with 
anyone’s free exercise of religion and took no step toward a burdensome establishment of any 
religion. But that is not the premise from which we start.”); Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, 
Restoring Religious Freedom to the Workplace: Title VII, RFRA and Religious Accommodation, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2513, 2530 (1996) (describing the Braunfeld Court as “applying rational basis 
review”). 
 120. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 417 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (“I 
cannot agree that today’s decision can stand consistently with Braunfeld v. Brown.”); id. at 421 
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The line of cases including Braunfeld, Sherbert, and the conscientious 
objector cases121 makes it somewhat difficult to tell how heavily free exercise 
concerns are weighed, or even whether one standard is being used that can 
explain all of these cases. The lack of clarity is exacerbated in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder,122 because of how the Court treats the distinction between a 
philosophical or merely personal moral code on the one hand and religious 
views on the other. 
Yoder involved a Wisconsin law requiring children to attend school until 
their sixteenth birthday.123 Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy were 
Amish who declined to send their fourteen- or fifteen-year-old children to 
public school beyond the eighth grade,124 because they believed that sending 
their children to high school not only violated their religious convictions125 but 
would “endanger their own salvation and that of their children.”126 The 
sincerity of belief was not at issue.127 
The respondents believed that high school inculcated the wrong values by 
“emphasiz[ing] intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, 
competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students.”128 In 
contrast, “Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of 
‘goodness,’ rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical 
knowledge, community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, 
rather than integration with, contemporary worldly society.”129 While the 
Amish believed that “their children must have basic skills in the ‘three R’s’ in 
order to read the Bible, to be good farmers and citizens, and to be able to deal 
with non-Amish people when necessary in the course of daily affairs,”130 they 
did not want their children to attend high school. Doing so would take the 
 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[D]espite the Court’s protestations to the contrary, the decision 
necessarily overrules Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, which held that it did not offend the 
‘Free Exercise’ Clause of the Constitution for a State to forbid a Sabbatarian to do business on 
Sunday.”). 
 121. See supra notes 25–72 and accompanying text (discussing the conscientious objector 
cases). 
 122. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 123. Id. at 207 (“Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their 
children to attend public or private school until reaching age 16.”). 
 124. Id. (“[R]espondents declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after 
they complete the eighth grade.”). 
 125. Id. at 209 (“[R]espondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish 
communities generally, that their children’s attendance at high school, public or private, was 
contrary to the Amish religion and way of life.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (“The State stipulated that respondents’ religious beliefs were sincere.”). 
 128. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 212. 
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children “away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the 
crucial and formative adolescent period of life [d]uring [which] . . . the 
children must acquire Amish attitudes favoring manual work and self-reliance 
and the specific skills needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or 
housewife.”131 
The Yoder Court explained that “only those interests of the highest order 
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free 
exercise of religion.”132 But such a robust standard has to be cabined in some 
way and the Court suggested that “[a] way of life, however virtuous and 
admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of 
education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection 
of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.”133 
Determining which beliefs are religious and which are not “present[s] a 
most delicate question.”134 The Court offered an example. “[I]f the Amish 
asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the 
contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau 
rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, 
their claims would not rest on a religious basis.”135 Because “Thoreau’s choice 
was philosophical and personal rather than religious, . . . such belief does not 
rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.”136 Yet, the Court’s discussion of 
Thoreau was confusing, because his values were deeply held,137 and the Court 
had suggested in the conscientious objector cases that deeply held beliefs and 
values might be treated as religious.138 
What criteria are used to determine whether particular beliefs are “not 
merely a matter of personal preference?”139 The Court noted that “the 
traditional way of life of the Amish is . . . of deep religious conviction, shared 
by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living.”140 It was not 
clear whether any of these factors was necessary or sufficient to trigger free 
 
 131. Id. at 211. 
 132. Id. at 215. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. 
 135. Id. at 216. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory 
of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. L. REV. 9, 
56 (2001) (suggesting that Thoreau’s values were “deeply held”). 
 138. See supra notes 25–51 and accompanying text (discussing Seeger and Welsh). 
 139. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216. 
 140. Id. 
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exercise protection, although the Court was obviously satisfied that a belief 
meeting all of these criteria was protected by the applicable guarantees.141 
Accepting that the Amish beliefs and values were religious in nature, the 
Court next addressed whether the action at issue in the case (the Amish 
keeping their children out of school) was protected by free exercise guarantees. 
While acknowledging that “activities of individuals, even when religiously 
based, are often subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their 
undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the 
Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers,” citing both 
Braunfeld and Gillette,142 the Court rejected that “religiously grounded conduct 
is always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.”143 Noting that 
“there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under 
regulations of general applicability,” citing Sherbert,144 the Court explained 
that “[w]here fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake”145 the 
Court must “searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote . 
. . and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing 
the claimed . . . exemption.”146 Rejecting the state’s claim that “upon leaving 
the Amish community Amish children, with their practical agricultural training 
and habits of industry and self-reliance, would become burdens on society 
because of educational shortcomings,”147 the Court held that “the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from compelling respondents to 
cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16.”148 
The Yoder Court seemed to strike a blow for tolerance and diversity when 
suggesting that “[a] way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no 
rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.”149 
Perhaps as a way of showing that Congress also believed that the Amish 
deserved to be exempted from some of the requirements of generally 
applicable laws, the Court noted that “Congress itself recognized their self-
 
 141. See Destyn D. Stallings, Comment, A Tough Pill to Swallow: Whether the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act Obligates Catholic Organizations to Cover Their Employees’ 
Prescription Contraceptives, 48 TULSA L. REV. 117, 127 (2012) (noting that “the belief satisfied 
all three criteria”). 
 142. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) and 
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)). 
 143. Id. at 219–20. 
 144. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
 145. Id. at 221 
 146. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
 147. Id. at 224. 
 148. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234. 
 149. Id. at 224. 
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sufficiency by authorizing exemption of such groups as the Amish from the 
obligation to pay social security taxes.”150 
Yoder raises a number of issues including how to differentiate between a 
religious way of life and mere personal preferences. For example, how should 
religiously based beliefs be handled if they appear idiosyncratic or at least not 
generally held by those professing that faith? Thomas v. Review Board of 
Indiana Employment Security Division151 seemed to provide a partial answer. 
At issue in Thomas was whether Eddie Thomas was entitled to receive 
unemployment benefits after he quit his job rather than produce armaments in 
violation of conscience.152 He applied for unemployment benefits, explaining 
why he had quit.153 Although a friend of the same faith tradition had advised 
him that the work to which he had been assigned was not “unscriptural,”154 
Thomas disagreed.155 
Thomas was denied unemployment benefits.156 When explaining why that 
denial did not offend free exercise guarantees, the Indiana Supreme Court 
explained that “the belief was more ‘personal philosophical choice’ than 
religious belief,”157 although the Indiana court also suggested that “a 
termination motivated by religion is not for ‘good cause’ objectively related to 
the work.”158 
The Thomas Court explained that while “[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion 
are protected by the Free Exercise Clause,”159 a separate question involves 
which beliefs are thereby protected. “The determination of what is a ‘religious’ 
 
 150. Id. at 222. 
 151. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 152. Id. at 709 (“Thomas terminated his employment in the Blaw-Knox Foundry & 
Machinery Co. when he was transferred from the roll foundry to a department that produced 
turrets for military tanks. He claimed his religious beliefs prevented him from participating in the 
production of war materials.”). 
 153. Id. at 710–11 (“Thomas applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the 
Indiana Employment Security Act. At an administrative hearing where he was not represented by 
counsel, he testified that he believed that contributing to the production of arms violated his 
religion.”). 
 154. Id. at 711. 
 155. Id. (“Thomas was not able to ‘rest with’ this view, however. He concluded that his 
friend’s view was based upon a less strict reading of Witnesses’ principles than his own.”). 
 156. Id. at 712 (“The Review Board adopted the referee’s findings and conclusions, and 
affirmed the denial of benefits.”). 
 157. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713; See also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 
391 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (Ind. 1979) (“A personal philosophical choice rather than a religious 
choice, does not rise to the level of a first amendment claim of religious expression.”) (citing 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972)). 
 158. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713; See also Thomas, 391 N.E.2d at 1131 (“The disqualifying 
statute imposes only an indirect burden, if any, on claimant’s free exercise of his religion. It 
makes no religious practice unlawful.”). 
 159. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713. 
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belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate task.”160 
Nonetheless, when attempting to ascertain whether a particular practice was 
religious, certain modes of inquiry are not permissible. For example, “the 
resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the 
particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be 
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit 
First Amendment protection.”161 In explaining why the Indiana Supreme Court 
had relied too much on the testimony of Thomas’s friend that the work at issue 
was permissible, the Thomas Court noted that “[i]ntrafaith differences . . . are 
not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process 
is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion 
Clauses.”162 
Acknowledging that “an asserted claim [might be] so bizarre, so clearly 
nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free 
Exercise Clause,”163 the Court nonetheless explained that “it is not within the 
judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or 
his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common 
faith.”164 After all, “[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”165 
Because “[o]n this record, it is clear that Thomas terminated his employment 
for religious reasons,”166 the state had a heavy burden insofar as it was going to 
justify the benefit denial. The Court explained that “a person may not be 
compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and 
participation in an otherwise available public program.”167 In this case, “the 
employee was put to a choice between fidelity to religious belief or cessation 
of work,”168 and “the interests advanced by the State do not justify the burden 
placed on free exercise of religion.”169 
A year after supporting free exercise guarantees in Thomas, the Court 
seemed to undermine those very guarantees in United States v. Lee,170 where 
the Court examined whether an Amish employer refusing to pay into social 
 
 160. Id. at 714. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 715. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 716. 
 165. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 717. 
 169. Id. at 719. See also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Com’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 146 
(1987) (striking down Florida’s refusal to award unemployment benefits to an individual who 
was unemployed due to her refusal to work on her Sabbath); Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t. of Emp’t Sec., 
489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (striking down Illinois’s refusal to award unemployment benefits to an 
individual who refused to work on Sunday as a matter of religious conviction). 
 170. United States v. Edwin D. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982). 
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security could be punished without thereby violating constitutional guarantees. 
The Court first determined that Lee was not exempt under the applicable 
statue, construing the “exemption . . . [as] available only to self-employed 
individuals and . . . not . . . to employers or employees.”171 But that meant that 
Lee would only be successful if free exercise guarantees required that he be 
exempted.172 
The conflict arose because the “Amish believe that there is a religiously 
based obligation to provide for their fellow members the kind of assistance 
contemplated by the social security system.”173 The sincerity of that belief was 
not challenged,174 although the government had contended that “payment of 
social security taxes will not threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief 
or observance.”175 But the state cannot be an arbiter of what a particular 
religion requires,176 and the Court accepted as accurate that “payment and 
receipt of social security benefits is forbidden by the Amish faith.”177 
In discussing the states’ implicated interests, the Court noted that “[t]he 
social security system in the United States serves the public interest by 
providing a comprehensive insurance system with a variety of benefits 
available to all participants, with costs shared by employers and employees.”178 
Because the “social security system is by far the largest domestic governmental 
program in the United States today, distributing approximately $11 billion 
monthly to 36 million Americans,”179 the Court reasoned that “the 
Government’s interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in 
and contribution to the social security system is very high.”180 But that speaks 
to the government maintenance of the system as a general matter, and the 
important determination was “whether accommodating the Amish belief will 
unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest.”181 
The Court reasoned that the issues in Lee were quite different from those 
presented in Yoder, because “it would be difficult to accommodate the 
comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a 
 
 171. Id. at 256. 
 172. Id. (“Thus any exemption from payment of the employer’s share of social security taxes 
must come from a constitutionally required exemption.”). 
 173. Id. at 257. 
 174. Id. (“the Government does not challenge the sincerity of this belief”). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 257 (“It is not within ‘the judicial function and judicial 
competence,’ however, to determine whether appellee or the Government has the proper 
interpretation of the Amish faith; ‘[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.’” (citing 
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981))). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 258. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 258–59. 
 181. Id. at 259. 
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wide variety of religious beliefs.”182 Further, “[t]here is no principled way . . . 
for purposes of this case to distinguish between general taxes and those 
imposed under the Social Security Act.”183 But that meant that if Lee were 
exempted then if “a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain 
percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related 
activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt 
from paying that percentage of the income tax.”184 The Court then explained 
that because the “tax system could not function if denominations were allowed 
to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that 
violates their religious belief”185 and “[b]ecause the broad public interest in 
maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in 
conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.”186 The 
tax system would itself be undermined were the Court to recognize a right to a 
religious exemption in this case, so Lee’s challenge on constitutional grounds 
was rejected. 
In what has been described as a decision representing the virtual 
abandonment of free exercise protection,187 the Court decided Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, which 
addressed “whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits 
the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach 
of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus permits the 
State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs 
because of such religiously inspired use.”188 Alfred Smith and Galen Black 
were fired from their employment with a private drug rehabilitation 
organization because they used peyote as part of a religious ritual.189 They 
were denied unemployment compensation because their firing had been for 
cause.190 
 
 182. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259–60. 
 183. Id. at 260. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional 
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 231 (1991) (discussing “the virtual abandonment of the Free 
Exercise Clause in the . . . case of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. 
Smith”). 
 188. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
 189. Id. (“Respondents Alfred Smith and Galen Black . . . were fired from their jobs with a 
private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at 
a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both are members.”). 
 190. Id. (“When respondents applied to petitioner Employment Division . . . for 
unemployment compensation, they were determined to be ineligible for benefits because they had 
been discharged for work-related ‘misconduct.’”). 
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Oregon criminalized the use of peyote even for religious purposes,191 and 
the respondents argued that “their religious motivation for using peyote places 
them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their 
religious practice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who 
use the drug for other reasons.”192 The Smith Court denied that “an individual’s 
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law 
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate,”193 interpreting the 
prevailing jurisprudence to be that “the First Amendment bars application of a 
neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action . . . [only if] 
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections”194 is implicated. For example, it read Cantwell as involving 
freedom of religion and freedom of speech195 and Yoder as freedom of religion 
plus the parents’ freedom to direct the education of their children.196 The Court 
contrasted those cases with “[t]he present case [which] does not present such a 
hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any 
communicative activity or parental right.”197 
While Sherbert and Thomas might seem to suggest a different rule, the 
Court claimed that it had “never invalidated any governmental action on the 
basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation.”198 
That Smith was also an unemployment compensation case did not faze the 
Court199—this case was distinguishable because the others did not “require 
exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law.”200 
The Smith Court then discussed why it did not believe strict scrutiny 
appropriate in this kind of free exercise case, noting that the “‘compelling 
government interest’ requirement seems benign, because it is familiar from 
other fields.”201 But its use in the free exercise context “would produce . . . a 
private right to ignore generally applicable laws . . . [which would be] a 
constitutional anomaly.”202 The Court also worried about the breadth of the 
 
 191. Id. at 876 (“Oregon does prohibit the religious use of peyote.”). 
 192. Id. at 878. 
 193. Id. at 878–79. 
 194. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 882. 
 198. Id. at 883. 
 199. Id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“We held, however, in Employment Div., Dept. of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (Smith I), that whether a State may, 
consistent with federal law, deny unemployment compensation benefits to persons for their 
religious use of peyote depends on whether the State, as a matter of state law, has criminalized the 
underlying conduct. See id. at 670–72.”) 
 200. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
 201. Id. at 885–86. 
 202. Id. at 886. 
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protections that might thereby be accorded, noting that free exercise 
protections could not be limited to religious beliefs of central importance. “It is 
no more appropriate for judges to determine the ‘centrality’ of religious beliefs 
before applying a ‘compelling interest’ test in the free exercise field, than it 
would be for them to determine the ‘importance’ of ideas before applying the 
‘compelling interest’ test in the free speech field.”203 The Court reasoned that 
“[i]f the ‘compelling interest’ test is to be applied at all, then, it must be 
applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously 
commanded,”204 and warned that such an application would result in striking 
down a variety of laws.205 
Congress reacted to Smith206 by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA),207 which was intended to require both state and federal 
governments to meet a very difficult test in order to justify their burdening free 
exercise rights.208 This difficult test would be triggered even when the 
government was not targeting religious practice but, instead, was burdening 
that practice as a result of a “rule of general applicability.”209 Congress 
specifically referred to the test used in Sherbert and Yoder, requiring that it be 
used to evaluate whether government burdening of free exercise was 
permissible.210 
The constitutionality of that act was tested in City of Boerne v. Flores.211 
At issue was a denial of a building permit to a church wishing to expand its 
facilities in the city of Boerne, Texas.212 The denial was challenged as a 
violation of RFRA.213 The Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional, at least 
 
 203. Id. at 886–87. 
 204. Id. at 888. 
 205. Id. (“[I]f ‘compelling interest’ really means what it says (and watering it down here 
would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test.”). 
 206. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–13 (1997) (“Congress enacted RFRA in 
direct response to the Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).”). 
 207. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2012). 
 208. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 507 (“RFRA prohibits ‘[g]overnment’ from ‘substantially 
burden[ing]’ a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden ‘(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that . . . 
interest.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1. RFRA’s mandate applies to any branch of Federal or State 
Government.”). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 U.S. 2751, 2784–85 (2014). 
 211. Flores, 521 U.S. at 507. 
 212. Id. at 511 (“A decision by local zoning authorities to deny a church a building permit 
was challenged under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.”). 
 213. Id. at 512 (“The Archbishop relied upon RFRA as one basis for relief from the refusal to 
issue the permit.”). 
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as applied to the states.214 That caused the state legislatures to react by enacting 
their own state versions of RFRA in an effort to afford more protection to the 
free exercise of religion. 
III.  STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACTS 
In response to the Smith Court’s narrow reading of free exercise guarantees 
and the Flores Court’s striking down RFRA as applied to the states, various 
state legislatures passed state religious freedom restoration acts.215 While the 
acts vary in language,216 they are all designed to correct Smith’s alleged 
undermining of free exercise protections.217 Yet, the state RFRAs have proven 
to be less protective than might originally have been thought,218 and it is 
helpful to consider a few of the state cases litigated under the state RFRAs to 
understand why that is so. 
A. Freeman 
Florida has had substantial litigation219 under its state RFRA,220 and it may 
be helpful to understand how that statute has been interpreted. Consider 
 
 214. See id. at 536 (“Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of 
powers and the federal balance.”). 
 215. See John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. 
REV. 787, 820 n.165 (2014) (“In response to Smith and City of Boerne, a number of post-Smith 
state legislative acts or constitutional amendments provided increased protections for religious 
freedom.”). 
 216. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 
S.D. L. REV. 466, 478–79 (2010) (discussing some of the differences among the state RFRAs). 
 217. See id. at 466 (“Smith, as everyone knows, dramatically narrowed the scope of the Free 
Exercise Clause.”). 
 218. Id. at 467 (“In most jurisdictions, plaintiffs have not won a single state RFRA case 
litigated to judgment. To be sure, some states have seen significant state RFRA litigation and 
there have been some very important victories. But in many states, state RFRAs seem to exist 
almost entirely on the books.”). 
 219. Id. at 481 (“Florida passed its RFRA early; it has seen substantial litigation. Yet of all 
the claims asserted over the years, only a single state Florida RFRA claim litigated to judgment 
has won.”). 
 220. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 
1) The government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that government may 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application 
of the burden to the person: 
(a) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
(2) A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may 
assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate 
relief. 
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Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,221 which 
involved a challenge to a denial of a driver’s license because Sultaana Lakiana 
Myke Freeman “refused to have her picture taken without her veil.”222 
Freeman was permitted to wear her veil when she was photographed for her 
Illinois driver’s license,223 but Florida law requires a “‘fullface’ photograph of 
the license holder.”224 She was informed that she could not get a license unless 
she were willing to have a photograph taken without a veil,225 which she 
testified was simply not an option.226 
An expert for the state testified that “where the Department had 
accommodated the belief by having a female photographer and no males 
present, a Muslim woman could have her license photograph taken.”227 An 
expert for Freeman testified that “Muslim women must veil themselves and 
that . . . the doctrine of necessity, found in Islamic law, [could not be] applied 
to [permit] removing the veil to take a driver’s license photograph.”228 
While accepting that Freeman’s beliefs were sincere,229 the Florida 
appellate court rejected that a substantial burden had been placed on Freeman’s 
religious exercise.230 Because there had been testimony that it was 
“[c]onsistent with Islamic law [for] women . . . [to be] required to unveil for 
medical needs and for certain photo ID cards,”231 and because “the 
Department’s existing procedure would accommodate Freeman’s veiling 
beliefs by using a female photographer with no other person present,”232 this 
meant that “[h]er veiling practice is ‘merely inconvenienc[ed]’ by the 
photograph requirement [and that] . . . she failed to demonstrate a substantial 
burden.”233 While the Freeman court “recognize[d] the tension created as a 
result of choosing between following the dictates of one’s religion and the 
mandates of secular law,”234 it reasoned that “as long as the laws are neutral 
and generally applicable to the citizenry, they must be obeyed,”235 citing 
Braunfeld in support.236 
 
 221. Freeman v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. App. 2006). 
 222. Id. at 50. 
 223. See id. at 51. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See id. at 52. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 52. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See id. at 54. 
 230. Id. (“[T]here is no substantial burden on Freeman’s exercise of religion.”). 
 231. Id. at 56. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 57. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
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The Freeman court readily admitted that the “protection afforded to the 
free exercise of religiously motivated activity under the FRFRA [Florida 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act] is broader than that afforded by the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.”237 However, it rejected that the 
substantial burden test under the Florida act had been met238 and thus had no 
need to determine whether the state could meet its “heavy dual burden of 
demonstrating a compelling interest and that the regulation is the least 
restrictive means to meet that interest.”239 
If Thomas is any guide,240 then the mere fact that others of the faith may 
have different views about what the religion permits and prohibits does not 
undermine an individual’s claim that a restriction imposes a substantial burden 
on her free exercise rights.241 That said, at least two points might be made. 
First, whether federal constitutional guarantees are violated by the Florida 
requirement that those receiving a Florida driver’s license be photographed 
without a veil is not the focus of this discussion—such a determination might 
depend on whether this is a neutral, generally applicable law and on whether 
there are very important interests justifying such a law. Second, a separate 
question is whether the Florida court’s interpretation of what constitutes a 
substantial burden for purposes of the statute was itself too restrictive—it may 
be that the Florida Supreme Court’s “narrow definition of substantial burden” 
was not meant to be this narrow.242 In any event, the interpretation of the 
Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act offered in Freeman is clearly not 
as robust as might have been expected under the Sherbert-Thomas line of 
cases.243 
B. Christian Romany Church Ministries 
At issue in Christian Romany Church Ministries, Inc. v. Broward County 
was whether the county would be permitted to condemn and remove a church 
through use of its eminent domain power.244 While the county’s doing so 
 
 237. Id. at 55 (citing Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023, 1032 (Fla. 2004)). 
 238. Id. at 54. 
 239. Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 56. 
 240. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 241. Lund, supra note 216, at 488 (“The court essentially says that because other Muslim 
women in other countries remove the veil for photographs, Freeman should consider herself free 
to do so as well. But . . . [i]ndividuals have a right to religious accommodation even on matters 
where they differ from their co-religionists.”). 
 242. See Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 56 (“The narrow definition of substantial burden adopted by 
the supreme court tempers the act’s strict scrutiny requirement. A plaintiff must meet a high 
standard to show a substantial burden on religious freedom.”). 
 243. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 707. 
 244. Christian Romany Church Ministries, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 980 So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
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served a public purpose,245 the church nonetheless claimed that its 
condemnation would violate Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act246 
because the church had nowhere else to go.247 
Condemnation and destruction of the church might result in the 
congregation’s being unable to hold worship services, which would seem to be 
a paradigmatic example of burdening free exercise.248 Yet, the court rejected 
that the challenged action would impose such a burden for purposes of the 
state’s Religious Freedom Protection Act, because condemnation could not be 
construed as either compelling or forbidding religious conduct.249 Because 
there was “nothing about this location that is unique or integral to the conduct 
of the religion,”250 the court held that “the condemnation does not substantially 
burden the exercise of religion.”251 
Perhaps the Florida appellate court is correct that condemnation does not 
qualify as imposing a substantial burden on religion for purposes of the state 
RFRA. Absent some evidence of “bad faith or gross abuse of discretion,”252 it 
may be that state law did not prevent the church from being forced to move. 
But it can hardly be thought that Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
provides robust protection if a church can be condemned (for an admittedly 
legitimate purpose) even when that condemnation and destruction would make 
it impossible for the congregation to worship.253 
C. Cordingley 
At issue in Idaho v. Cordingley254 was whether Cordingley’s possession of 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia was protected under the Idaho Free Exercise 
 
 245. Id. (“[T]he church does not dispute that the taking would serve a public purpose.”). 
 246. Id. (“[The church] asserts that the county has failed to show a reasonable necessity for 
the taking and is in violation of the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act (FRFRA).”). 
 247. Id. at 1166 (“The pastor testified that he did not know where they will go if the church is 
taken, and he has no other place for holding religious education.”). 
 248. See id. at 1168 (“[The] church’s insistence that a specific church building for holding 
worship services is fundamental to religious exercise.”). 
 249. Id. (“Our supreme court expressly rejected any definition of substantial burden other 
than that compelling conduct or that forbidding conduct. By no stretch does an otherwise valid 
condemnation fall within these limits.”). 
 250. Christian Romany Church, 980 So. 2d at 1168. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 1167. 
 253. Cf. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“We find that the County imposed a substantial burden on Appellee Guru Nanak Sikh 
Society of Yuba City’s . . . religious exercise under RLUIPA because the stated reasons and 
history behind the denial at issue, and a previous denial of Guru Nanak’s application to build a 
temple on a parcel of land zoned ‘residential,’ to a significantly great extent lessened the 
possibility of Guru Nanak constructing a temple in the future.”). 
 254. Idaho v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013). 
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of Religion Protected Act (FERPA).255 Cordingley had founded the “Church of 
Cognitive Therapy (COCT), established specifically for the use of marijuana as 
a ‘sacrament,’”256 and he argued that his religious exercise was substantially 
burdened by Idaho law. 
The Idaho appellate court explained that the “legislative history of the 
FERPA makes it clear that in adopting the statute, the Idaho legislature 
intended to adopt the ‘compelling interest test’ contained in its federal 
counterpart, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which the United 
States Supreme Court held in City of Boerne v. Flores . . . was invalid as it 
applied to states.”257 The plaintiff had to show that he was engaging in a 
religious exercise and that the challenged state law substantially burdened that 
exercise.258 
At issue was not whether Cordingley’s beliefs were sincere or even 
whether the Idaho law substantially burdened the activity associated with those 
beliefs.259 Instead, the issue was whether the beliefs at issue were “religious” 
for purposes of the Idaho statute when Cordingley had admitted that “the 
Church of Cognitive Therapy is not so much a religion as it is a companion to 
religion.”260 As such, it provided a way for people to “become spiritual or 
enlightened, but it [did] not have a comprehensive belief system with the 
trappings of a religion.”261 
When analyzing whether the burdened practices qualified as religious, the 
court cited to Ballard and Thomas, but also cited Yoder’s attempt to distinguish 
between the religious and the merely personal and philosophical.262 The Idaho 
court denied that it was trying to be extremely restrictive with respect to what 
constituted a religion, instead suggesting that should there be “any doubt about 
 
 255. Id. at 731 (“Levon Fred Cordingley appeals from the district court’s intermediate 
appellate decision affirming the magistrate’s denial of his motion to dismiss the possession of 
marijuana and paraphernalia charges against him on the basis his right to religious freedom under 
the Idaho Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act (FERPA).”). 
 256. Id. at 732. 
 257. Id. at 733. 
 258. See id. (“To establish a prima facie RFRA claim, a plaintiff must present evidence 
sufficient to allow a trier of fact rationally to find the existence of two elements. First, the 
activities the plaintiff claims are burdened by the government action must be an ‘exercise of 
religion.’ Second, the government action must ‘substantially burden’ the plaintiff’s exercise of 
religion.”) (quoting Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 259. Id. at 734 (“[I]t was undisputed that Cordingley’s beliefs were both sincerely held and 
substantially burdened by the applicable controlled substances statutes.”). 
 260. Cordingley, 302 P.3d at 734 (citing the district court opinion). 
 261. Id. (citing the district court opinion). 
 262. Id. at 736. 
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whether a particular set of beliefs constitutes a religion, the court will err on 
the side of freedom and find the beliefs are a religion.”263 
To determine whether the beliefs at issue constituted religious beliefs, the 
court used a multifactor test. “Under this test, to help determine whether a 
particular set of beliefs qualifies as ‘religious’ under the RFRA or its state 
equivalent, a court examines the extent to which a party’s asserted ‘religion’ 
(1) addresses ‘deeper and more imponderable questions’ of the meaning of life, 
man’s role in the universe, moral issues of right and wrong, and other ‘ultimate 
concerns’; (2) contains an ‘element of comprehensiveness’; and (3) the 
‘formal, external, or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted 
religions.’”264 
The court found that the church met the relevant criteria to some extent.265 
However, because some of the factors were not met and because “COCT is 
singularly focused on the use of marijuana to a degree that has consistently 
been found not to be indicative of statutorily recognized religious practice,”266 
the Idaho appellate court found that the practices at issue were not religious 
and thus did not qualify for enhanced protection under the Idaho statute. 
Yet, it is difficult to reconcile this approach with the approach taken in 
Ballard, where the beliefs of the “I Am movement”267 were not examined with 
respect to whether they incorporated “ultimate ideas” or constituted a “moral 
or ethical belief structure” or even whether the “comprehensiveness of beliefs” 
entitled the group to be designated as religious. The Ballard Court noted that 
“[r]eligious experiences which are as real as life to some may be 
incomprehensible to others,”268 and that the fact that certain experiences are 
“beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect 
before the law.”269 Further, a set of beliefs that is described by the adherents as 
a “companion to religion”270 would seem to be religious even if not providing 
many desired metaphysical answers, precisely because it was to be understood 
in light of other beliefs or belief systems. 
That said, it was fair for the Cordingley court to point out that the United 
States Supreme Court has not always espoused deference to the claim that 
particular views are religious.271 The Yoder Court suggested that it is 
 
 263. Id. (citing United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1499 (D. Wyo. 1995)). 
 264. Id. (Adams, J., concurring) (citing Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208–09 (3d Cir. 
1979)). 
 265. Id. at 744 (“to some degree the COCT is comprised of a structure containing some of the 
‘accoutrements of religion’”). 
 266. Cordingley, 302 P.3d at 745. 
 267. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 79 (1944). 
 268. Id. at 86. 
 269. Id. at 87. 
 270. Cordingley, 154 P.3d at 734. 
 271. See id. at 736 (discussing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972)). 
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permissible to distinguish between the religious and the philosophical,272 
although the Court provided no guidance about how to perform that task 
beyond saying that Thoreau’s views were not religious.273 The failure to say 
more was regrettable, if only because many of such analyses will be subject to 
one of the dangers mentioned by the Ballard Court—permitting the trier-of-
fact to decide whether a particular set of beliefs is religious or, perhaps, 
sufficiently profound or comprehensive opens the door to a potentially 
unsympathetic trier-of-fact subjecting a set of avowedly religious beliefs to 
very critical examination.274 While Yoder might have been trying to protect the 
diversity of religious belief,275 it has been used to exclude belief systems from 
qualifying as religious. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Several states passed their own versions of religious freedom restoration 
acts in response to the Smith Court’s narrow construction of free exercise 
guarantees.276 While those statutes clearly rejected Smith and attempted to 
restore substantial protection of certain religious practices, they did not provide 
sufficient clarity with respect either to which beliefs would count as religious 
or to what would constitute a substantial burden of religious practice.277 
Reinstating strict scrutiny of limitations on free exercise does not as a practical 
matter yield great protection if it is very difficult to qualify as a religion or very 
difficult to establish that a particular restriction imposes a substantial burden 
on religious practice.278 
The state courts’ application of their respective state RFRAs has not 
resulted in robust protection of free exercise. That may be due in part to the 
uneven protection of free exercise in the pre-Smith jurisprudence and in part to 
the failure of the respective legislatures to provide more guidance to the 
courts.279 Other factors likely playing a role are that courts may fear both that 
according robust protection on the basis of a state RFRA will create the 
 
 272. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Cf. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87 (“The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, 
life after death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If one could be 
sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those teachings false, little indeed would 
be left of religious freedom.”). 
 275. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220–21. 
 276. Steven D. Collier, Beyond Seeger/Welsh: Redefining Religion under the Constitution, 31 
EMORY L.J. 973, 1010–11 (1982). 
 277. James W. Wright Jr., Making State Religious Freedom Restoration Amendments 
Effective, 61 ALA. L.R., 425, 426, 429 (2010). 
 278. Id. at 430–31. 
 279. Id. at 435. 
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potential for a large number of religious exemption claims,280 and that the 
sincerity requirement will not do enough to keep out the “non-meritorious” 
claims. Further, whether consciously or unconsciously, triers-of-fact (and 
legislators) may be less willing to credit minority religious beliefs and 
practices either with respect to whether they really are religious beliefs or with 
respect to whether neutral state laws really substantially burden those 
beliefs,281 so it should be unsurprising that state RFRAs have not provided 
robust free exercise protection of minority religious practices.282 
Several cases involving state RFRAs have involved individuals who 
sought exemptions from state laws prohibiting the use of controlled 
substances.283 It may be that in individual cases those challenging their 
convictions were not engaging in sincere religious exercise.284 Nonetheless, 
there is no small irony in a court focusing on the sacramental use of drugs as a 
reason to deny religious exercise even when some other indicia of religion are 
met,285 given that the case sparking the various state RFRAs involved 
sacramental use of proscribed drugs.286 So, too, there is no small irony in a 
state finding no violation of the state RFRA when condemnation of a church 
 
 280. Cf. Evan J. Bergeron, Comment, Organized RFRAFF: A Recommendation to the 
Louisiana Legislature on the Best Way to Accomplish a State Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 133, 164 (2010) (“Whether the drafters and supporters of House Bill 340 
were simply ignorant of the ramifications of protecting mere expression or whether they made a 
conscious and calculated attempt to open the floodgates for religious preferential treatment is 
unclear.”). 
 281. Cf. Frank S. Ravitch, The Unbearable Lightness of Free Exercise under Smith: 
Exemptions, Dasein, and the More Nuanced Approach of the Japanese Supreme Court, 44 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 259, 269 (2011) (“The dominant or majority religious community will generally be 
protected because its beliefs will be understood, and perhaps empathized with, but for religious 
minorities, quite the opposite might be true.”); Molly A. Gerratt, Note, Closing A Loophole: 
Headley v. Church of Scientology International as an Argument for Placing Limits on the 
Ministerial Exception from Clergy Disputes, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 141, 188 (2011) (“[I]t is less 
likely that lawmakers will take counter-majoritarian free exercise claims into consideration when 
legislating or that judges will take those claims seriously when judging their sincerity.”). 
 282. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits on Free Exercise Accommodations, 
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was at issue—Flores, which involved a church seeking a zoning variance, 
resulted in the Court invalidating the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act’s application to the states, 287 and also sparked the state RFRAs. 
The United States Supreme Court has long been sending mixed messages 
about free exercise, sometimes suggesting that religious belief is immune from 
second-guessing and sometimes suggesting not only that religious practices 
can be prevented or punished but also that the state burden justifying such 
limitations is not very great. The Court has also sent mixed signals about 
whether or how religious beliefs can be distinguished from other kinds of 
beliefs. Because the Court has offered so many mixed signals for decades, it is 
unsurprising the state legislatures’ repudiating one decision and praising a few 
others has not resulted in robust protection of free exercise at the state level. 
Nor are we likely to see a major change in the future whereby minority 
religious practices will be afforded more protection. Instead, on both the state 
and federal level, we are likely to continue to see uneven and unprincipled 
protection of free exercise, which should satisfy no one. 
 
 
 287. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (“A decision by local zoning 
authorities to deny a church a building permit was challenged under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. The case calls into question the authority 
of Congress to enact RFRA. We conclude the statute exceeds Congress’ power.”). 
